SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES LEGISLATIONTHE SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISORY ROLE
United States Supreme Court decisions in 1964 and 1965 indicate that
the Court will be less tolerant in its review of congressional legislation
in the field of subversive activity. This further emphasizes an emerging
judicial trend of close supervision over legislative restrictions upon personal liberties.' Where such liberties are sought to be regulated, the
Court will clearly require Congress or any legislature to narrowly draft
statutes and gear the legislative sanctions to the precise evils which it
has the power to regulate. In short, legislative "painting with a broad
brush" will not be tolerated. For the Court has announced that:
(E)ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed2 in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
EARLIER DECISIONS

A. Subversive Activities Cases
The real importance of these recent decisions is the extent to which
they modify the Supreme Court's earlier practice of giving the statute
every benefit of the doubt. A review of these earlier Supreme Court decisions reveals that the Court engaged to some extent in a kind of judicial
rewriting in order to save subversive activities legislation. In Dennis v.
United States,3 some of the top Communist Party leaders were successfully convicted in the lower court for violating the advocacy clause of
the Smith Act of 1940.' That clause provided:
Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person-( 1) to knowingly or willfully advocate,.. . or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety
of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by
force or violence,.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to
conspire to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of...
this title.
In reviewing the petitioners' claim that the statute prohibited constitutionally protected speech on political subjects in violation of the First
Amendment, the Court narrowly construed the statute. It read into the
statute a congressional intent to outlaw only "advocacy" which incited
others to a course "of action" (rather than mere "advocacy in the realm
of ideas") 5 "with (specific) intent" to accomplish the illegal purpose,6 "as
1See Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1962).
2

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).

3 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

4 18 U.S.C. §§10, 11 (1946), as amended; 18 U.S.C. §2385.
5Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951).
6Id. at 499, 500.
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speedily as circumstances would permit".' The Court then concluded that
such speech presented a "clear and present danger of (bringing about)
the substantive evil (in this case, the threat to the national security)
which (Congress) had the right to prevent."' As to the argument that
such a construction of the statute would present constitutional questions
of lack of notice and vagueness, the Court noted that the jury under
proper instructions found that these petitioners had in fact violated the
statute which thus disposed of their contention.' But in a later case,
Yates v. United States,"0 the Court reversed the conviction of several
other Communist Party members under the advocacy clause because the
trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that the statute only punished advocacy as a course of action."
In Scales v. United States," the petitioner was convicted in the lower
court for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act of 1940."
That clause made it a felony to acquire or hold knowing membership in
any organization which advocated the overthrow of the Government of
the United States by force or violence. In reviewing a claim that the
statute unconstitutionally infringed petitioner's freedom of political expression and association, the Court again narrowly construed the clause
under consideration, reading into the membership clause a congressional
intent to punish only knowing "active" membership in such an organization "with specific intent" to bring about violent overthrow of the Government "as speedily as circumstances would permit."' 4 Simply proving
.mere membership in a prohibited organization was insufficient for punishment under this clause.'" Thus the Court imposed a strict burden of proof
on the Government; to successfully convict under the clause, the Government had to prove 1) illegal party advocacy and 2) active membership by
the defendant in the party with specific intent to bring about the violent
overthrow of the Government.'" Failure to produce sufficient evidence to
support each of these requisites would result in a reversal.' These essential elements had to be written into the statute to avoid a "close constitutional question." This was recognized by Mr. Justice Black, who in dissenting from the majority opinion in the Scales case, insisted that:
7 Id. at 510.
8 Id. at 515.
9

1d. at 515-17.
10 354 U.S. 298 (1961).
1
1 Id. at 324-27.
12367 U.S. 203 (1961).
Is 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1958).
14 367 U.S. 203, 220-22 (1961).
15 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
16 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220 (1961). See generally, 23 Ohio S.L.J. 762
(1962).
17 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961).
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...in an attempt to bring the issue of the constitutionality of the membership clause of the Smith Act within the authority of the Dennis and
Yates cases, the Court has practically rewritten the statute under which
petitioner stands convicted by treating the requirements of "activity"
and "specific intent" as implicit in the words that plainly do not include
them. 8
In commenting on the Scales case, one writer has said:
The "active" requirement was ... written into the statute because there
would be constitutional problems which could be avoided by creating
this requirement .... The Scales decision demonstrates the lengths to
which the Court will go to save a congressional statute from unconstitutionality. 19
B. Bill of Attainder Cases
A review of other earlier Supreme Court cases reveals that the Court
also departed from established precedents when subsversive activities
legislation was attacked as violating the bill of attainder clause. The
words of that clause seem clear: "No bill of attainder ... shall be passed
(by the Congress). '"2" History will disclose that these words were placed
-in the Constitution by the Framers to prohibit the legislature from punishing individuals or groups by legislative fiat.2 Although the bill of
attainder clause had not been frequently invoked prior to 1950, it had
received a judicial interpretation which best served to carry out the purpose for which it was adopted. In Cummings v. Missouri, 2 a priest was
convicted under a Missouri statute for teaching and preaching without
taking a loyalty oath that he had never been in sympathy with the South.
In holding this provision to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder, the
Court observed that it was "legislation which inflicts punishment without
a judicial trial. 23 In Ex parte Garland,4 the Court found that a federal
act requiring all attorneys practicing in the federal courts to take an
oath similar to the one in the Cummings case was also a bill of attainder.
The Court said that:
The statute is directed against parties who have offended in any of the
particulars embraced by these clauses. And its object is to exclude them
from the profession of the law .... All enactments of this kind ... are
subject to2 5the constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of
attainder.
In 1946 in United States v. Lovett,26 the Court held that Section 304 of
18 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 260 (1961). tI should be noted that Mr. Justice
Black also dissented from the majority opinion in the Dennis case, although he failed there
to mention the fact that the majority was judicially rewriting the statute.
1931 U. Cin. L., Rev. 161 (1962).
20 U.S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl.
3.
2172 Yale L.J. 330 (1962-1963).
22
71 U.S. (4Wall.) 277 (1867).
23

Id. at 323.

24

71 U.S. (4Wall.) 333 (1867).

25

Id. at 377.
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the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 27 constituted a bill of
attainder. This act which prohibited payment of any of the appropriations after November, 1943, to Lovett and certain other government
employees was passed as a result of charges made by the Chairman of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities that the employees were
affiliated with Communist-front organizations. In overturning the act as
a bill of attainder, the Court stated:
Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way
as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of
attainder prohibited by the Constitution .... 28
In light of these precedents which so facilitated the underlying purpose
of the bill of attainder clause, it seems clear that the Court departed from

them in American Communications Association v. Douds.29 The Douds

case involved the validity of Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act,30
which conditioned a union's access to the National Labor Relations Board
upon the filing of affidavits by all of its officers attesting that they were
not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party. In holding that
Section 9(h) was not a bill of attainder, the Court distinguished the Cummings, Garland,and Lovett cases. The Court stated that:
In (those cases) the individuals involved were in fact being punished

for past actions; whereas in this case (Douds) they are subject to possible loss of position only because there is a substantial ground for the
congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct ....
Section 9(h) is intended to prevent
future action rather than to punish past actions.31

In making this distinction between the Douds case and the earlier cases,
the Court thus held that the bill of attainder clause was violated only when
the legislators atempted to punish an individual or group for past actions.
In commenting on the departure of the Douds decision from the established precedents, one writer has stated:
From the early days of the Constitution through the decision of United
States v. Lovett in 1946, the Court treated the bill of attainder clause
as a blanket prohibition of all forms of legislative punishment of specific
groups. Since the decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds

in 1950, however, the Court has espoused the view that the historical
roots of the bill of attainder proscription limit its scope to a narrowly
restricted and technically defined class of legislative acts ....

Douds

26 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
2757 Stat. 431,450 (1943).
28 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946).

29 339 U.S.382 (1950).
30 61 Stat. 136, 146 (1940). 29 U.S.C. (Supp.III) §§141, 159(h), amending the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §151.
3' American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950).
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emphasized that historically32bills of attainder inflicted punishment for
past acts rather than future.
Another writer, speaking on the same subject, said:
The language of Cummings decision seems to state that bills of attainder
atways operate only against past conduct, this is not true historically.
...
There

is no reason why it ought to be true since the real objection to
such bills is how they operate rather than the conduct they operate
against. Indications are, however, that the Supreme Court presently believes that only retrospective bills can be attainders.m

The Douds case also indicated that in order for legislation to be held in
violation of the bill of attainder clause such legislation not only must
punish for past actions, but also must leave no means available to the
person to escape from its prohibition. The Court stated:
Here the intention is to forestall future dangerous acts; there is no one
who may not, by a voluntary alterationof the 3loyalties
which impel him
4
to action, become eligible to sign the affidavit.

By so narrowing the scope of the clause, the bill of attainder prohibition
was rendered lifeless in subsequent cases, especially those involving subversive activities legislation. In 1962 it was observed that "Since (Douds),
the Supreme Court has not condemned any statute as a bill of attainder,
although the issue has been raised at least twelve times." 11
It would appear that the reason for the Supreme Court's willingness
to engage in judicial rewriting and to depart from established precedent
in order to save subversive activities legislation from constitutional defect
was a recognition of the strong congressional interest involved-that of
the nation's security.36 The Court could not help but take judicial notice
of the fact that as a result of a long and intensive investigation Congress
had discovered that there existed a world-wide Communist' movement,
foreign dominated, which was preparing for the overthrow of the existing
Government of the United States. Moreover, Congress had recently passed
legislation which was designed to prevent that movement from accomplishing its purpose." " With such an important interest at stake, it is under32 72 Yale L.J. 332-33, 336--37 (1962-1963).
3 1961 Wash. U.L.Q. 413-14.
34 American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950).
35 72 Yale L.J. 335 (1962-1963).
36 See, e.g.,
15 U.Fla.L.Rev. 381 (1962-1963). See also, 72 Yale L.J. 363 (1962-1963).
37 64 Stat. 978 (1950) ;50 U.S.C. §781. Section 781 provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 781. Congressional finding of necessity.

As a result of evidence adduced before various committees of the Senate and House of Representatives the Congress finds that
1)There exists a world Communist movement which, in itsorigins, its development, and its present
practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose is . . . to establish a Communist

totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide
Communist organization ..

4) The direction and control of the world Communist movement is vested in and exercised by the
Communist dictatorship of a foreign country ..
6) The Communist-action organizations so established and utilized in various countries, acting
under such control, direction, and discipline, endeavor to carry out the objectives of the world Com.
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standable why the Court over a period of fourteen years balanced heavily
in favor of the governmental interest over that of the individual's personal liberties in cases attacking the constitutionality of such legislation.
Yet, on the other hand, the Court over the same period in reviewing state
legislation (which was not concerned with the national security and subversive activity) infringing personal liberties balanced heavily in favor of
the individual's liberties. 8 Thus it appears that the Court had developed
two standards by which it reviewed legislation when under constitutional
attack.
RECENT DECISIONS

The emerging trend of the Court, however, seems to demand application of a uniform standard whether it is reviewing subversive activities
legislation or any other legislation claimed to be in violation of the Constitution. Thus subversive activities legislation found to be overly-broad
in infringing upon personal liberties will not be judicially rewritten; nor
will the purpose of the bill of attainder clause be subverted when such
legislation is found to be in violation of that clause. The recent Supreme
Court decisions in this field seem to reveal such a new trend. In Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 9 the petitioners had their passports revoked under
Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,40 which made
it a crime for a member of a Communist organization under final order
of the Board to register, to apply for or use a passport. In holding this
section overly broad in its limitation on the Fifth Amendment right to
travel, the Court said:
munist movement by bringing about the overthrow of existing governments by any available means,
including force if necessary ....
15) . . . The Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent
successes of Communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States . . . ,
and make it necessary that Congress . . . enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of
such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United
States.

38 In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), a State registration statute requiring the
NAACP to produce all of its records, including its membership lists, was held unconstitutional.
In overturning the statute, the Supreme Court stated "the State failed to show a controlling
justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which
disclosure of membership lists is likely to have." 357 U.S. at 466. Also, in Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960), an Arkansas statute which required every teacher (as a condition of
employment) to file annually an affidavit listing every organization to which he belonged or
regularly contributed within the preceeding five years was held unconstitutional. In finding
this statute constitutionally defective, the Court said:
To compel a teacher to disclose every associational tie is to impair his right to free association, a right
closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free
society. . . . The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute (here involved) and its comprehensive interference with associational freedom go far beyond what might be justified in the exercise
of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competence of its teachers bring it within the
bar of our prior cases. 364 U.S. at 485.
39 378 U.S. 500 (1964).

40 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §785.
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Such freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values... (and)
even though the governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial
(here protection of national security), such purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
41
same basic purpose.
The Court pointed out that the defects of Section 6 were that the act
applied whether or not the member actually knew or believed he was
associated with a Communist-action or Communist-front organization; 4 2
irrespective of the member's degree of activity in the organization and
his commitment to its purposes; 43 regardless of the purpose for which
the individual wished to travel; 44 and regardless of the security-sensitivity
of the areas in which members wished to travel.45 Since there were less
drastic means of safeguarding national security, the Court concluded that:
The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe. The broad and enveloping prohibition
indiscriminately excludes plainly relevant considerations such as the
individual's knowledge, activity, commitment, and purposes in and
places for travel. The section therefore is patently not a regulation
"narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil," yet here, as elsewhere,
precision must be the touchstone of legislation so affecting basic free46
doms.

In answer to the Government's argument that the act should be held constitutional as applied to these top-ranking Party leaders, the Court said
that the function of "constru(ing) legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack ... will not (be carried) to the point of . . . judicially
rewriting it." 41 Because of the clarity and preciseness of the words in the
act, any attempt to narrow its scope, the Court said, "would inject an
element of vagueness into the statute's scope and application," which
"would not be proper; or desirable, in dealing with a section which so
severely curtails personal liberty." 48
An even more recent case, Brown v. United States, 49 further illustrates
41 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964). It should be noted that the
Court in overturning this statute cited the cases discussed in note 38, supra, which seems to
indicate that the same standards are being applied to subversive activities legislation, as that
being applied to state statutes dealing with interests other than national security.
42 Id. at 507.
43 Id. at 510.
44 Id. at 511.
45
Id. at 512. Since the Court in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), upheld a State Department Order restricting travel to Cuba, it would appear that the right to travel may, even
under the new trend of the Court, be restricted if the area is a sensitive one.
46
Id.at 514.
47
Id. at 515.
48 Id. at 516.
49 381 U.S. 437 (1965).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

214

[Vol. I

the Supreme Court's new approach. There the Court re-examined the
scope and purposes of the bill of attainder clause, returning to the reasoning of precedent established prior to the Douds case. In Brown the respondent was an avowed Communist who served on the Executive Board
of Local 10 (a San Francisco branch of the International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union). He was convicted in the lower court under
Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,5° which made it a crime for a Communist Party member to hold an
office in a labor union. In arriving at its decision that Section 504 constituted a bill of attainder, the Court reviewed the historical background
of the bill of attainder clause noting that it was inserted as an implementation to the docrine of separation of powers, i.e., as a "safeguard against
...

trial by legislature." "' Admittedly, Congress could keep from positions

affecting interstate commerce those persons who might use their position
to bring about "political strikes"-the stated purpose of Section 504. But
in enacting this provision Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority. For that section
...designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring
52
criminal liability-members of the Communist Party.
But Congress' authority in such a case is limited to "setting out rules of
general applicability." 5 Such rules could decree that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics shall not hold
union office, leaving for the courts and juries the job of deciding what
persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics; 1 and still remain within constitutional bounds.
In the Brown case, the Court cited Cummings, Garland, and Lovett,
stating that its decision was on firm ground with these cases. It stated
that the Douds Court, however, had simply misread Lovett when distinguishing that case on the ground that the sanction imposed there was
levied purely for "retributive reasons." "I Neither was it material that
Lovett punished a list of named individuals as distinguished from Brown
which punished membership of the Communist Party. " The Court con50 73 Stat. 536 (1959),

29 U.S.C. §504. This statute replaced Section 9(h) which was

upheld in the Douds case.
51 Brown v. United States, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
52 Id. at 450.
53 Id. at 461.

54 Id. at 450.
55 Id. at 456. However, the requirement as espoused by Douds that the legislation must
leave no means of escape to constitute a bill of attainder seems to have been sactioned by the
Court. But the Court found that Section 504 violated this requirement since from "the
moment (of its enactment, Brown) was given the choice of declining a leadership position or
incurring criminal liability." 381 U.S. at 452.

56 Id. at 461.
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cluded that while Congress can weed out dangerous persons from the
labor movement, it must do so by rules of general applicability, without
designating those upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied;
that although Congress possesses full legislative authority under our Constitution, the task of adjudication must be left to tribunals; and that
while the Court is always reluctant to declare that a congressional act
violates the Constitution, here the Court had no other alternative.57
Finally, Elftbrandt v. Russell 58 provided further indications that the
Court will no longer attempt to save federal statutes from unconstitutionality. Petitioner, a teacher, successfully challenged the Arizona loyalty
oath and its "'statutory gloss" which subjected to discharge and prosecution for perjury any person who took the oath and becomes or remains a
member of any organization having as one of its purposes the overthrow
of the government of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions where the
employee had knowledge of the unlawful purpose. 9 The Court's objection
was that the legislation subjected a citizen to prosecution for "knowing
but guiltless behavior." 6
CONCLUSIONS

There seems to be little doubt but that the Aptheker and Brown decisions point to a new trend which has emerged as the Supreme Court
carries out a kind of supervisory role over congressional subversive
activities legislation. Thus in the future,. the Court apparently will insist
on precise and narrow drafting of such legislation. Hastily drawn statutes
that suffer from overbreadth in infringing personal liberties will undoubtedly continue to be overturned. Hence future statutes which aim at punishing Communist Party members for the exercise of those liberties guaranteed by the First and Fifth amendments must be so narrowly drawn as
to insure that the prohibition reaches only those acts which have sufficient
nexus with the relevant evil prohibited in the interest of national security.
For the Court has warned that internal security legislation "cannot cut
deeper into (those) freedoms ...

than is necessary to deal with the sub-

stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 61 In meeting this
requirement of narrow drafting, legislators must remember that the
Court will not engage in "judicial rewriting" in order to save such
statutes. Any legislative attempt to name the Communist Party (and
apply sanctions ipso facto) will likewise be overturned under the Court's
present trend.
57 Id. at 461-62.

58 Elfbrandt v. Russell, - U.S. -,

86 S.Ct. 1238 (1966).

59 Id. at 1239.
60 Id. at 1241.
61
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961). Accord., Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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It is possible to speculate (based upon the fact that the Dennis and
Scales cases were upheld by only a 5 to 4 margin) that neither the
advocacy clause nor the membership clause of the Smith Act would satisfy
the current Supreme Court. Since the Court is no longer "judicially rewriting" such statutes in order to save them, the clauses seem to fall
short of the requirements established by the Court. A quote from the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Scales case would seem
to add weight to this prophecy. There Mr. Justice Douglas said:
Of course, government can move against those who take up arms against
it. Of course, the constituted authority has the right to self-preservation.
But we deal in this prosecution of Scales only with the legality of ideas
and beliefs, not with overt acts.... We have too often been "balancing"

the right of speech and association against other values in society if we,
the judges, feel that a particular need is more important than those
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. This approach, which treats the commands of the First Amendment as "no more than admonitions of moderation runs counter to our prior decisions. ..

."

(But) (w)hat we lose by

majority vote today may be reclaimed at a future time when the fear of
advocacy, dissent, and nonconformity no longer cast a shadow over us.62
James White

6

2 Scales v. United States, supra note 61 at 270.

